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THE NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT PHYSICAL
MANIFESTATIONS OF EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL
DISTRESS DO NOT SATISFY THE WARSAW
CONVENTION'S "BODILY INJURY"
REQUIREMENT-CAREY V. UNITED AIRLINES
J. BRENT ALLDREDGE*
TN EASTERN AIRLINES, Inc. v. Floyd,' the Supreme Court re-
Kjected the view that there can be any recovery for purely
mental injuries under the limited liability provisions of the War-
saw Convention 2 and concluded that unless a passenger was
made to "suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation
of injury," an air carrier could not be held liable. However,
while the court effectively ruled out recovery for purely mental
injuries, it expressly declined to state its views concerning
whether passengers could recover for mental injuries accompa-
nied by physical manifestations of injury,4 leaving "open the
question of whether such physical manifestations satisfy the
'bodily injury' requirement ' 5 of the Warsaw Convention's Arti-
cle 17.6 Attempting to answer this question, the Court of Ap-
* Candidate for J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2003; B.A., Brigham Young University, 2000. I am especially grateful to my wife,
Laura, and to my parents, David & Dyanne Alldredge, for their loving support
and stubborn optimism.
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Concluded at Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat.
3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3 Foyd, 499 U.S. at 552.
4 Id.
5 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).
6 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states in part: "The carrier shall be lia-
ble for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or
any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger." Warsaw Convention, supra note
2, art. 17. "From its inception [the bodily injury requirement] has proved con-
tentious in its application as courts adjudicating claims under Article 17 have
conservatively interpreted the phrase 'bodily injury' as either pure physical injury
or mental suffering accompanied by physical injury where the latter was a causa-
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peals for the Ninth Circuit determined that physical
manifestations of emotional distress do not satisfy the bodily in-
jury requirement and the Warsaw Convention, therefore, pro-
vides no remedy.7 In reaching its conclusion, however, the
court failed to make any reasonable distinction between Carey's
physical manifestations of emotional distress and other cases
wherein recovery was available to plaintiffs that could not
demonstrate a physical injury, but were able, nevertheless, to sat-
isfy the bodily injury requirement.8
During a flight from Costa Rica to Los Angeles en route to his
home in Portland, a United Airlines ("United") flight attendant
and an alleged representative of the Federal Airline Administra-
tion ("FAA") confronted Carey and an altercation ensued.9 At
different times in the flight, two of Carey's three daughters, as-
signed to seats in the coach section of the aircraft and hoping to
relieve their earaches, sought pain medication from their father,
seated in the first class cabin.'" Referring to FAA regulations, a
flight attendant warned Carey that it was impermissible for his
children to enter the first class cabin and Carey complied de-
spite the fact that his daughter was crying and in pain.11 Carey's
second child subsequently entered the first class cabin and the
flight attendant proceeded to reprimand Carey and threatened
arrest, stating that there was a representative of the FAA aboard
the flight with the authority to do so.'
2
When Carey later confronted the alleged FAA representative
and asked to see some identification, the alleged representative
and the flight attendant both refused to give the alleged FAA
agent's name." This resulted in an altercation wherein Carey
tive factor in bringing about the former." Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Dis-
tress in Aviation Claims-Emergent Trends, 65J. AIR L. & COM. 225, 225 (2000). Part
of the difficulty arises from the tendency of courts to try to determine the inten-
tion of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention and their use of the French term
"lesion corporelle" in Article 17. See, e.g., Gregory C. Fisk, Recovery for Emotional
Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning
of Lesion Corporelle, 25 TEX. INT'L LJ. 127 (1990).
7 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053.
8 Id. at 1053-54.
'9 Id. at 1046. For the purposes of its summary judgment motion, United did
not dispute Carey's allegations; therefore, the facts are Carey's version of events
on the flight from Costa Rica to Los Angeles as presented in a letter from Carey
to United's Chairman of the Board. Id. at 1046 n.1.
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was insulted, profaned, and humiliated in the presence of the
other passengers.' 4 Upon his return to Portland, Carey learned
from a telephone conversation with the FAA that the alleged
representative on the flight was probably not an FAA agent after
all. 5 Following the incident Carey claimed not only to have suf-
fered severe emotional and mental distress, but also nausea,
cramps, perspiration, nervousness, tension, and sleeplessness.' 6
Carey sued United in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and false im-
prisonment.17 United responded with a motion for summary
judgment arguing, in part, that: (1) the Warsaw Convention pre-
cludes Carey's state law claims; (2) Carey has no claim under the
Warsaw Convention because he did not suffer a bodily injury
caused by an accident; and (3) even if there were an accident,
Carey cannot recover for purely mental injuries. 18 Magistrate
Judge Hubel, agreeing with United, concluded that the Warsaw
Convention did, in fact, govern Carey's claims and that his inju-
ries did not satisfy the requirements for carrier liability.' 9 As a
result, the district court granted United's motion for summary
judgment.20
Appealing the lower court's decision, Carey argued that the
Warsaw Convention was not his exclusive remedy and that, even
if it was, his injuries satisfied the bodily injury requirement of
Article 17.2' Reviewing the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, the Ninth Circuit first looked to El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, noting that the Supreme Court reversed a
court of appeals holding that although a plaintiff could not re-
cover under the Warsaw Convention, it was not her exclusive
remedy.22 On the contrary, the Supreme Court held that "the
Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an
action for personal injury damages under local law when her
claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Con-
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1046 n.2.
16 Id. at 1046.
'7 Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (Or. 1999), affd,
255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
18 Id. at 1168-69.
19 Id. at 1173-74.
20 Id. at 1176.
21 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1046.
22 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999), revg, 122 F.3d 99
(2d Cir. 1997).
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vention. '23 Encouraged by the ruling in Tseng, the court went
on to conclude that not only is the Warsaw Convention Carey's
exclusive remedy, but also that there are no exceptions to this
rule even in the case of an air carrier's intentional misconduct. 24
Once the court determined the Warsaw Convention afforded
Carey's only remedy, it broached the subject of whether Carey's
injuries satisfied Article 17's bodily injury requirement. 25 This
question is considerably more complex than the first and has
led courts to treat the requirement with some measure of vague-
ness and ambiguity.26 The Carey court, for example, began its
analysis by pointing to the fact that there is a significant amount
of case law suggesting that, under the Warsaw Convention, there
can be no recovery for mental injuries unaccompanied by physi-
cal injuries. 27 At the same time, however, the court recognized
that these cases were not directly on point, as they did not spe-
cifically address whether physical manifestations of emotional
distress, as opposed to emotional distress flowing from physical
injuries, satisfy the requirement. 28
The court relies heavily on the conclusions drawn in Ter-
rafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.,29 particularly as they ap-
ply to the meaning of the French term "lesion corporelle, ' 3° the
legislative history of the Warsaw Convention, and the intent of
the signatory nations:" Ultimately, the Carey court concluded
that " [b] ecause the plaintiff could not 'demonstrate direct, con-
crete, bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear or
23 Id. at 176.
24 Even though the plaintiff in Tseng waived her challenge to the district
court's finding that "willful misconduct" cannot be an "accident" under the War-
saw Convention, the Supreme Court included as dicta an indication that "inten-
tional misconduct can fall tinder the definition of 'accident,' provided that the
conduct otherwise meets the standard laid out in Saks." Carey, 255 F.3d at 1049.
See Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
25 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051.
26 Compare Carey, 255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (physical manifestations of
emotional distress do no satisfy the bodily injury requirement), with Weaver v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999) (posttraumatic stress
disorder resulting from biochemical reactions brought on by terror is considered
a "bodily injury"), and In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31,
1994, 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (family members of crash victims recov-
ered for mental injuries from pre-impact terror).
27 See, e.g., Floyd, 499 U.S. at 534.
28 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051-52.
29 Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.,151 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1998).
30 See discussion supra note 6.
31 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052. It should be noted that many of these conclusion
were drawn, in turn, from Floyd.
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anxiety,"' the conditions for imposing liability under Article 17
were left unsatisfied.12 The court takes this argument to the ex-
treme, writing: "To the extent that such plaintiffs are left with-
out a remedy, no matter how egregious the airline's conduct,
that is a result of the deal struck among the signatories of the
Warsaw Convention. '
The court's concern seems to arise from a fear that compen-
sating plaintiffs suffering from physical manifestations of emo-
tional distress would open the floodgates of litigation and
would, in effect, transform the Floyd standard into an easily satis-
fied pleading formality. 4 The reality of the situation is that the
floodgates have, in a sense, already been opened and, although
the court does recognize this fact, it does so dismissively. For
example, almost as an afterthought, the court notes that in
Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 5 posttraumatic stress disorder meets
Article 17's bodily injury requirement because the plaintiff in
that case "had experienced biochemical reactions as a result of
her terror. '36 Also, in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indi-
ana on October 31, 1994, family members of passengers received
compensation for the terror suffered by the passengers prior to
receiving their "injuries" in the crash.37
The court argues that the issues raised in Weaver, Roselawn and
Carey are entirely different.3 8 The fact remains, however, that
the plaintiffs in these cases suffered some form of emotional dis-
tress not flowing from a physical injury, and in both Weaver and
Roselawn the courts found the claims compensable.3 9 The court
tried to distinguish these two cases from Carey by contending
that the plaintiffs in Roselawn recovered damages because the
emotional distress of the crash victims was closely associated with
the injuries actually incurred in the crash.4" This reasoning ig-
nores the fact that the emotional distress suffered by the passen-
gers prior to impact was detached from the injuries the victims
inevitably received when the aircraft did crash. In its response
to Weaver, the court left open the possibility that a plaintiff who
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1053.
34 Id. at 1052.
35 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999).
36 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053 n.47.
37 In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 954 F.
Supp. 175 (N.D. I1. 1997).
38 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1054.
39 Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1192; Roselawn, 954 F. Supp. at 179.
40 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1054.
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experiences "biochemical reactions" resulting from emotional
distress may recover damages."
These types of reactions are no different from Carey's claim
that physical manifestations arose from the emotional distress
brought on as a result of his mistreatment by United. The diffi-
culty arises from the reluctance of courts to recognize as action-
able claims that are extremely difficult to prove. After all,
"[m]ere pain of mind has hitherto been recognized as being
abstract and indefinable in terms of visual assessment. ' 42 As
medical diagnostic tools have improved, however, direct connec-
tions have been made between emotional agitation (including
anxiety and fear) and "a general disruption of the internal or-
gans of the human body," including reactions such as imbal-
ances in the digestive process and dryness of mouth.4" The
connections between Carey's emotional condition and the phys-
ical manifestations that arise from it are at least as clear as those
recognized in Weaver and Roselawn, albeit of an entirely different
degree.
Despite the court's conclusion that the signatories of the War-
saw Convention left no remedy for plaintiffs like Carey, "no mat-
ter how egregious the airline's conduct, '44 Judge Nelson
contradicted his own reasoning by agreeing that cases like
Weaver have left open the possibility that there can be "recovery
for egregious incidents... where there is no concrete or visible
'bodily injury."'45 As a result, it appears that the only difference
noted by the court is one measured by the degree of harm to
the plaintiff. Courts should not, therefore, conclude that the
decision in Carey excludes all claims of mental distress under the
Warsaw Convention whether accompanied by physical manifes-
tations or not. Instead, the notion of mental distress must be
"viewed with circumspection, which could be done," not by ex-
cluding the claim altogether, but "by imposing stringent stan-
41 Id. at 1053 n.47.
42 Abeyratne, supra note 6, at 228.
43 Id. at 230 (citing WALTER B. CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER,
FEAR AND RAGE: AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT RESEARCHES INTO THE FUNCTION OF EMO-
TIONAL EXCITEMENT 253-326, 325-26 (2d ed. 1953); WALTER B. CANNON, THE WIS-
DOM OF THE BODY 286 (revised and enlarged ed. 1939); Roy R. Grinker, The
Physiology of Emotions, in THE PHYSIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS: REPORT OF THE THIRD
ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS IN NORTHERN CALIFOR-
NIA, SAN FRANCISCO 3 (Alexander Simon et al. eds. 1961)).
44 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053.
45 Id. at 1053 n.47.
1006
CAREY V. UNITED AIRLINES
dards of proof of injury on the plaintiff."46 Depending upon the
severity or egregiousness of the act leading to alleged physical
manifestations of emotional distress, a plaintiffs burden of
proof would then vary in degree of difficulty. For example, it is
much easier to imagine the emotional ramifications associated
with a flight attendant threatening to crash an aircraft into a
mountain than it is to imagine the emotional ramifications of
the same flight attendant verbally abusing and threatening to
arrest a passenger.
In the court's eagerness to define an objective bright-line rule
regarding whether physical manifestations of emotional distress
satisfy the Warsaw Convention's bodily injury requirement, it
fails to sufficiently distinguish the reasoning of other courts and
the exceptions they. have made affecting air carrier liability.
Other than the degree of severity or egregiousness of the event
leading to a plaintiffs emotional distress, there seems to be little
connection between cases like Weaver and Roselawn, where plain-
tiffs have been able to recover for emotional distress not flowing
from physical injury. Therefore, rather than use the bodily in-
jury requirement to exclude all claims of emotional distress ac-
companied by physical manifestations, the courts should permit
plaintiffs, at the very least, the opportunity to address a high and
stringent burden of proof.
46 Abeyratne, supra note 6, at 230.
10072002]
0
~AS. It*~
